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The Greening Garden: Equality
Rights Under the Canadian
Constitution
D. Geoffrey Cowper, Q.C.*

I. SUMMARY
In the 2003 term the Supreme Court of Canada pronounced two
unanimous judgments finding that section 15 equality rights had been
violated. In both cases, the Court applied the Law v. Canada (Minister
of Employment and Immigration)1 analysis and did not retreat from the
features of its section 15 jurisprudence which have previously attracted
criticism in this and other venues. This paper provides a review of these
two recent cases with a view to assessing whether they represent an
emerging consensus and, particularly, with a view to where they suggest
future controversy.

II. 2003 DEVELOPMENTS — OVERVIEW
The Court pronounced unanimous judgments in Trociuk v. British
Columbia (Attorney General)2 and Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v.
Laseur.3 In Trociuk,4 the Court overturned sections of the Vital Statistics
Act5 which permitted a mother who did not acknowledge the father to
select and register the child’s name, and to omit the father’s particulars
on the basis the statute unconstitutionally excluded participation of the
*
1
2
3
4
5

Partner with Fasken Martineau DuMoutin LLP, in Vancouver, British Columbia.
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, [1999] S.C.J. No. 12.
[2003] 1 S.C.R. 835, [2003] S.C.J. No. 32.
[2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54.
Trociuk, supra, note 2, at para. 47.
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 479, ss. 3(1)(b), 4(1)(a) and 3(6)(b).
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biological father in the registration and naming process on the basis of
sex.
In Martin,6 the Court held that Nova Scotia’s Workers’ Compensation Regulations,7 which excluded chronic pain from the reach of regular compensation and provided in lieu a functional restoration program,
constituted an unconstitutional exclusion of benefits on the grounds of
physical disability.

III. ANALYTIC OVERVIEW
The Court’s jurisprudence in section 15 has been criticized as being
vague and incapable of ready application. The divisions within the
Court in equality cases have been criticized as indicative of a lack of
consensus and institutional leadership from the Court.8 The unanimous
judgment in Law has been criticized as a compromise of several different concepts that fails to provide ready guidance to the lower Courts.
Despite these criticisms, these two unanimous judgments make it clear
that the Court is holding to the Law test.9
1. The Law Test
In upholding the Law10 test, the Court has also reaffirmed the central
role of human dignity in its reasoning:
The sole remaining question under the Law test is whether, from the
perspective of the reasonable claimant, the present differential effects
constitute a violation of dignity…11

6

Martin, supra, note 3, preamble.
Workers’ Compensation Act, S.N.S. 1994-95, c. 10, s. 10B — Functional Restoration
(Multi-Faceted Pain Services) Program Regulations, N.S. Reg. 57/96.
8
S. Lawrence, “Section 15(1) at the Supreme Court 2001-2002: Caution and Conflict
in Defining ‘The Most Difficult Right’” (2002) 16 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 103; C.D. Bredt and
A. Dodek, “Breaking the Law’s Grip on Equality: A New Paradigm for Section 15” (2003) 20
Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 33.
9
Law, supra, note 1, at para. 88.
10
Law, supra, note 1.
11
Trociuk, supra, note 2, at para. 13.
7
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Further, from Martin:12
On the contrary the denial of the reality of the pain suffered by the
affected workers reinforces widespread negative assumptions held by
employers, compensation officials and some members of the medical
profession, and demeans the essential human dignity of chronic pain
sufferers. The challenged provisions clearly violate s. 15(1) of the
Charter.13

It remains unclear, however, what analytical role human dignity plays in
the reasoning of the Court. In both cases, it may be said that offending
human dignity compendiously describes the conclusion of the discrimination analysis rather than serving as an element in the analytical
framework.
2. Perspective
The Court has also held steadfast to adopting a claimant’s reasonable perspective. As has been noted by the Court, this approach marries
both objective and subjective elements. The Court clearly is concerned
not to adopt a purely subjective perspective, but also wishes to realize
the remedial goals of section 15 by viewing the impact of legislative
distinctions from the claimant’s viewpoint. Once again, however, the
analytical role this element plays is unclear. The subjective/objective
blend offers a dominant influence to either the subjective element of
perspective, or the objective element of reasonableness depending on
the case. If the Court concludes a distinction is reasonable, then a claimant would be unreasonable in refusing to acknowledge this from his or
her perspective. On the other hand, adopting the perspective of a claimant appears to be no more than paying due regard to the impact of the
distinction on those adversely affected — something for which a subjective analysis is arguably unnecessary.

12
13

Martin, supra, note 3, at para. 66.
Martin, supra, note 3, at para. 5.
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3. Levels of Scrutiny
The Court has consistently rejected the notion of incorporating the
American jurisprudence respecting differing levels of scrutiny depending upon the ground of distinction. Nevertheless, the Court is developing a jurisprudence in which different concerns apply to different
categories. For example, the cases suggest that claims based on age
discrimination attract less initial scepticism and are permitted a more
rough and ready usage than distinctions based upon race or disability.
Although the Court is not developing levels of scrutiny as expressly
differential tests, it appears that as cases are decided, other cases involving the same ground of distinction may be of greater importance rather
than the general concept of human dignity. Certainly, the Martin14 case
evidences the Court’s concern that particular attention be had to the
requirements of substantive equality and accommodation where physical or mental disability is at issue.
One of the contextual factors identified in Law raises the varying
impact of categories by recognizing that the nature of the distinction is
important in assessing whether its use is discriminatory. In Andrews. v.
Law Society of British Columbia15 McIntyre J. identified the level of
scrutiny analysis as taking place largely within section 1, and contrasted
that express provision with the judicially created superstructure in U.S.
jurisprudence: see also R. v. Chaulk.16 Nevertheless, the result in Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs)17 and the
right to vote cases suggest that a strict approach has been taken to cases
involving an individual’s right to an effective vote.
The practical collision in the United States between the strict scrutiny analysis adopted for racial distinctions and the desire for innovation
in affirmative action programs has been avoided expressly through section 15(2) of the Charter. Certainly the U.S. jurisprudence also has come
under similar criticism as failing to provide a predictable or certain

14
15
16
17

Martin, supra, note 3.
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6.
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303, at para. 168, [1990] S.C.J. No. 139.
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, [1999] S.C.J. No. 24.
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analytical framework for equality cases.18 Difficulties of theory and
application are not confined to Canadian issues.

IV. TROCIUK V. BRITISH COLUMBIA (ATTORNEY GENERAL)
1. Reasoning in the Courts
This case concerned a claim arising from a paternity suit commenced by an unacknowledged father for, amongst other relief, an order
that the birth registry include his particulars and that the surname of the
triplets reflect both parents’ surnames in hyphenated fashion. In the
result the Court ordered the father’s particulars included, and referred
the question of the children’s surname to the lower Court to be determined in accordance with the amended legislation and the best interests
of the children. This case is one of the shortest decisions authored by the
Court in recent years and disposes of the entire case in 47 paragraphs.
The reasoning is admirably clear and readily followed. Finally, the result seems to flow from a philosophical premise that few would dispute:
the social value of both fathers and mothers being involved in significant ways with their children whether or not parental conflict exists.
Nevertheless, more is troubling about the reasoning in Trociuk19
than reassuring. The Court unanimously overturns the majority judgment in the Court of Appeal. The majority of that Court considered the
specific interests affected by the statute had far less of a human rights
dimension than appears to have been the conclusion in the Supreme
Court. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s statement of the parental
interests affected fails, in my view, to persuasively connect the general
policy of parental involvement with an unreasonable distinction made
by the statutory framework.
The Vital Statistics Act20 of British Columbia provided a biological
mother with the ability to submit a Statement of Live Birth on her own
and to choose whether to acknowledge the biological father. Under the
Vital Statistics Act,21 where the father is unacknowledged by or unknown
18
Peter Rubin, “Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to
Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw” (2000) 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1.
19
Trociuk, supra, note 2.
20
Vital Statistics Act, supra, note 5.
21
Id.
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to the mother, she has the statutory responsibility to file a statement and to
give a surname to the child. If a statement was registered by the putative
father, the Director was required to alter the registration of birth on the
application of a mother if she did not acknowledge the father. In Trociuk,22 the father and mother were estranged and she gave birth to triplets.
Various court orders for access, custody and support were obtained by the
father and the mother.
The trial judge dismissed the claim.23 The majority in the Court of
Appeal in two separate reasons dismissed the claim, with Prowse, J.A.
dissenting.24
The two statutory points at issue concerned:
1. the father’s particulars on the birth registry; and
2. the unilateral selection of a surname by the biological mother.
The father maintained in the Courts below that he had sedulously done
what he could to maintain his relationship with his children, to respect
their mother, and to participate fully in their lives.25
The material filed by the Director indicated that five per cent of
births at the time of trial did not include the father’s particulars. The
impression deposed to by the Director was that this was most commonly
the product of the absence of any relationship with the father, as well as
births associated with sexual assault, incest and more than one possible
father.26
Justice Southin in the Court of Appeal dedicated the bulk of her reasons to an interesting history of the custom, common law and statutory
history of British Columbia and other jurisdictions in relation to naming.
The most interesting for present purposes is her observation that at
common law there was no lawful restraint (aside from fraud) in adopting whatever name one wished. Before the 14th century, surnames were

22

T. (D.W.) v. British Columbia (Attorney General) (1999), 67 B.C.L.R. (3d) 389,
[1999] B.C.J. No. 1146 (S.C.) [hereinafter “Trociuk, B.C.S.C.”]; affd (2001), 200 D.L.R.
(4th) 685, 90 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, [2001] B.C.J. No. 1052 ( C.A.).
23
Id.
24
T. (D.W.) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2001] B.C.J. No. 1052, 90
B.C.L.R. (3d) 1 [hereinafter “Trociuk, B.C.C.A.”]
25
Trociuk, B.C.S.C., supra, note 22, at para. 6.
26
Trociuk, B.C.S.C., supra, note 22, at para. 18.
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unknown, and people were known by their given name and place, i.e.,
Thomas of Ottawa.27 Halsbury’s Laws of England notes that at common
law an illegimate child was not entitled to a surname by right of inheritance but could acquire one by reputation.28
Justice Prowse noted that a mother’s exclusive right to register the
child’s birth was only provided for in 1962.29
After 1987 it was a joint responsibility except where the father was
unacknowledged, unknown or incapable.
Curiously, the mother maintained that she had refused to acknowledge the father because he insisted the children bear his surname only.
In the Supreme Court he asked that an order be made giving them the
hyphenated name of both parents.30
The Supreme Court found that both interests were important means
of participating in the life of a child. As to the father’s particulars:
Including one’s particulars in a birth registration is an important means in
participating in the life of a child. A birth registration is not only an
instrument of prompt recording, it evidences the biological ties between
parent and child and including one’s particulars on the registration is a
means of affirming these ties.31

The Court noted that in the absence of particulars being included, a
father might not qualify for notice under the Adoption Act.32 However,
the statute provided that upon proof of paternity or if a man was the
subject of orders for access, custody or support that he would thereafter
be entitled to notice under the Adoption Act.33
Second, participating in the process of determining a child’s surname was found to be a significant right:
Contribution to the process of determining a child’s surname is
another significant mode of participation in the life of a child. For many in
our society, the act of naming a child holds great significance. As Prowse,

27

Trociuk, B.C.C.A., supra, note 24, at paras. 33-35.
Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3d, Vol. 3, (London: Butterworth & Co. (Publishers)
Ltd., 1953), at para. 161, citing Co. Litt. 3b.
29
Trociuk, B.C.C.A., supra, note 24, at para. 105.
30
Trociuk, B.C.S.C., supra, note 22, at para. 1.
31
Trociuk, [2003] S.C.J. No. 32, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835, headnote.
32
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 5.
33
Id., at s. 13(2)(c).
28
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J.A. notes, naming is often the occasion for celebration and the surname
itself symbolizes for many, familial bonds across generations (paras. 13839).34

The Court concluded that arbitrary exclusion of the father from these
means of participation constituted adverse statutory distinctions which
required the Court to analyze whether a reasonable claimant would view
these as demeaning to his dignity.
The Court dismissed the argument that because the father was not a
member of a historically disadvantaged group, he could not bring a
section 15 claim. Quite rightly, the Court pointed out that the legislature
was declaring that a father’s relationship with his children was being
unequally treated in the circumstances of the legislation. For that reason,
the Court concluded:
a reasonable claimant would perceive the message to be a negative
judgement of his worth as a human being.35

The Court then proceeded to deal with a less obvious effect of the legislation. The Court held that excluding the claimant from participation
associated him with two other categories of fathers: fathers unacknowledged for valid reasons and fathers incapable or unknown. The association with these other categories of what might be termed “deadbeat
dads” was concluded to be pejorative.
Further, the Court found that the association with these other fathers
communicated a stereotype or prejudice on the basis of being male.
The Court concluded that the absence of any redress for arbitrary
exclusion with respect to particulars and surnames was disrespectful to
fathers wishing to participate in their children’s lives. Before the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment, the Vital Statistics Act36 had been
amended to provide a mechanism for participation by unacknowledged
fathers as to the father’s particulars, but not as to surname.
The provisions under the Adoption Act37 referred to in the Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada providing for a father’s right
34

Trociuk, supra, note 31, at para. 17.
Id., at para. 21.
Vital Statistics Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 479, ss. 3(6)(d) and (6.1), as am. Health Planning Statutes Amendment Act, 2002, S.B.C. 2002, c. 15, s. 23.
37
Adoption Act, supra, note 32, ss. 13(1)(c), 13(2)(a).
35
36
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to notice expressly incorporated the right of a father to register himself
as the biological father, and to be given notice of a proposed adoption.
Indeed, the right to notice expressly included the plaintiff, who was
entitled by reason of section 13(2)(c) of the Adoption Act38 to have his
consent required to any adoption by reason of his paternity order and
access and custody order.
Curiously, the Vital Statistics Act39 provided the “casting vote” in
the event of a disagreement between two known parents with respect to
surname by providing that children shall be named by hyphenated name
with their parents’ names organized in alphabetical order. To avoid the
growth of hyphenated names, the Act provided that a parent’s hyphenated name only qualifies for the child’s hyphenated name as to one of
the two and again in alphabetical order. Mr. Trociuk was not entitled to
demand that his children be named as proposed by him to the court
because he had not filed a birth registration under the Act. Nevertheless,
the Name Act40 then provided that any custodial parent could apply for a
change of name and required the other parent’s consent only if that
parent wished to change the surname over to the other parent’s name.
Otherwise, a change of name could be had over the objection of the
other parent if that parent’s consent was withheld unreasonably.
Finally, the Court rejected the suggestion that there was an ameliorative purpose to permitting women alone to register births in those
circumstances so as to encourage registration and reduce parental conflict. The Court found that arbitrary exclusion of the father from the
activity of naming a child and registering particulars of the birth was not
in the best interests of a child.
With respect to section 1 justification, the Court found that the existence of alternative statutory mechanisms such as the amended regime
demonstrated that the father’s rights were not impaired as little as possible by the previous statutory regime. The amended regime permitted a
father to require his particulars be included, but left the mother’s initial
power to unacknowledge and unilaterally put a name in place.

38
39
40

Id.
Vital Statistics Act, supra, note 5, s. 4.1(2).
Name Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 328.
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2. Remedy
The Court determined that an immediate declaration of invalidity
might harm mothers who might reasonably want to unacknowledge
fathers for legitimate reasons. Accordingly a suspension of the declaration of validity for 12 months was granted. Second, the Court declined
to determine the surname of the children or to agree with the father that
the surname reflects the hyphenated name of both parents. The Court
concluded:
The amended legislation provides a procedure at which Mr. Trociuk can
apply to have his particulars included on the birth registration … this
Court is not in a position to determine whether the asked-for change of
surname is in the best interests of the children and, absent the consent of
both parents, this surely must be considered before an order to change the
surname can be made.41

The Court concluded by saying that any adequate legislative response
must account for the variety of interests discussed by the Court:
including the legitimate interests of the mother, the right of the father not
to be discriminated against on the basis of his sex and the best interests of
the child.42

3. Commentary
The other members of the Court clearly had no difficulty signing on
to this brief and lucid determination of unconstitutionality. The Court’s
reasons, however, are open, in my respectful view, to serious criticism.
One of the central criticisms of the concept of human dignity is that
it is vague, general, and malleable and does not play any genuine analytical role in shaping or influencing the analysis in any given case.
Certainly in Trociuk43 the use of the term human dignity associated with
the interests identified does not add to the persuasiveness of the analysis.

41
42
43

Trociuk, supra, note 31, at para. 44.
Trociuk, supra, note 31, at para. 45.
Trociuk, supra, note 31.
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What is most helpful is that the Court is extremely clear in identifying the interests which it says are offended as a matter of an equality
analysis. Are those interests, however, persuasively engaged?
The essence of the earlier statutory policy appeared to be that all
births have to be registered. Where a mother did not acknowledge a
father she was permitted to (and indeed required to) register the birth
and name independently of the biological father.
This function appears to be primarily administrative and understandable. Given that births should be registered within 30 days it does
not appear sensible to require a judicial process associated with the form
of registration. In circumstances where the father is present but unacknowledged, any form of registration of his particulars would require a
determination of paternity which is provided for under different statutory procedures. In this case, the mother did not acknowledge the plaintiff’s paternity, which had to be proved by DNA testing.
This observation appears to have been borne out by subsequent legislative changes. The province of British Columbia in response to the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada on May 20, 2004 pronounced
into force an amended regime which provides that the court may, in
declaring a child’s parentage, make an order that the registration of a
child’s name be changed and empowering the court to select the surname of either parent or a surname consisting of a hyphenated or combined name of both parents’ surnames. On the application, the
legislation provides that the court must consider the child’s best interests
if the child is 12 years or younger and otherwise have the child’s written
consent. On this order being made, the registration of birth is amended
to reflect the order and any birth certificate is thereafter issued “as if the
original registration had contained that name”.44 This statutory fiction
addresses the original exclusion by, in effect, erasing the official history.
In effect, the previous power of a custodial parent to apply to
change a child’s name has now been broadened to include any parent on
a successful paternity action based on the child’s best interests. It certainly appears that the court’s desire for participation by both mother
and father on an equal basis in the ultimate naming of a child has been
accomplished in the amended legislation. However, that equal participation is at the well of the court contending for the court’s favour. It has,
44

Vital Statistics Act, supra, note 5, s. 4.1.
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in effect, transferred a unilateral power in one parent to an adjudicative
power in the court. We have no experience with how this Solomonic
power will be administered, but there are few obvious anchors in reason
to dictate a surname in the best interests of a child.
In the dissent in the Court of Appeal and now the Supreme Court of
Canada the fact that the father whose particulars are registered must
receive statutory notice of a proposed adoption was emphasized as representing a real statutory significance to appearing on the particulars on
the registry. However, once paternity is established, then statutory notice of an adoption had to be provided anyway under the principal Act.
This statutory distinction does not appear to have had any real significance.
As an aspect of ascertaining disputed paternity, any regime which
permits a father to intervene for the purpose of having his particulars
noted on the registry must accommodate the necessity of proof of paternity. In any event however, can it be suggested persuasively that it is
unconstitutional to require an unacknowledged father to pursue proof of
paternity prior to being entitled to notice of a purported adoption? Any
alternative must somehow cope with women who refuse to acknowledge
the father of the child, and the necessity of proving paternity.
Justice Newbury in the Court of Appeal noted that the mother had
agreed prior to the Court of Appeal hearing to have the father’s particulars included in the registration.45 Accordingly, the only relief specific to
the parties granted by the Supreme Court (i.e., including the father’s
particulars) had not been in issue between the parties since prior to the
Court of Appeal hearing.
On this point, Newbury J.A.’s reasons concurring in the result in the
Court of Appeal seem preferable. She identifies the purposes of the
statute under consideration relating to the registration of births, and
distinguishes it from the other statutes which govern paternity and the
rights and obligations arising from paternity. She carefully addresses the
question of whether the Vital Statistics Act46 has the purpose or effect of
offending unacknowledged fathers and concludes that to the degree it

45
46

Trociuk, B.C.C.A., supra, note 24, at para. 172.
Vital Statistics Act, supra, note 36.
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does it arises from a rational balancing of the interests involved and not
any discriminatory purpose or effect.47
It could well be that the Charter has had its most salutary effects on
previously unnoticed injustices. Its application to this relatively unnoticed indignity does appear, however, to have more symbolic than real
justice about it. The fact that the mother had previously agreed to
change the particulars and that no real relief was granted in respect of
the children’s surnames supports the sense that despite being a unanimous application of section 15(1) that it will soon be more curiosity
than precedent.
Fathers have in western cultures placed some stock in having a
dominant influence in the selection of the surname of their children. I
suspect that naming has largely been culturally governed by the relevant
rules and customs of the particular society by means of paternal, maternal or other association. In most western systems, the paternal system of
naming was reflected in the automatic assignment of a father’s surname
to any children born to a lawful marriage.48
Where a child was born outside of a lawful marriage, the multiple
burdens placed upon single mothers were the source of much anguish.
In the absence of a conclusion of paternity and judicial findings of paternal responsibility a natural legislative choice with respect to surnames
would appear to be to permit that surname to be selected by the biological mother.
Was this exclusion of an unacknowledged father arbitrary? It appears to follow from the natural distance between a father and child
where the father is not acknowledged. Although that distance may not
be wholly the father’s doing, it is a product of a social failure: the absence of a relationship that would at least sustain a conversation about
the child’s name! The Court saves its clearest concern for the interests
of unjustifiably unacknowledged fathers without reference to the traditional concern: any father who had a child out of wedlock carried at
least some responsibility for the absence of a family to be born into.
The rising portion of the Canadian population who choose not to marry
before having children, or who choose to have children outside of marriage,
likely made a different legislative regime necessary. Mr. Trociuk’s claims
47
48

Trociuk, B.C.C.A., supra, note 24, at paras. 176-87.
Halsbury’s, supra, note 28.
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(although dismissed at the time) appear to have been the cause for the initial
amendments to the British Columbia legislation which permitted a father to
file an Order of the Court declaring the child’s paternity with the consequence that his particulars would then be included in the registration of
birth.
However, in circumstances of parental conflict (even in many cases
where there is no such conflict) the selection of a name requires a casting vote. In the present case the Court determined that it would not find
what was in the best interests of the child but that it would declare the
present regime to be invalid and require that any further regime take
account of the best interests of the child as well as the father’s interests.
With respect, it does not appear to this writer that the exclusion of
unacknowledged fathers from the Act represented an arbitrary exclusion
and that the analysis of section 15 merely replaced the Court’s policy
judgment as to how to resolve the obvious conflict (by judicial or independent determination of a child’s best interests) in substitution for
giving responsibility for making that choice of the child’s best interests
to the biological mother, or the custodial parent under the Name Act.49
With respect, it is telling that the reasons offer no content to the
child’s best interests in this context. What are the child’s best interests
in the circumstance such as that found in the case itself? It appears that
the parents had a fractured relationship resulting in the circumstance
where the father had to obtain judicial orders to prove his paternity and
to obtain access. How are the children’s best interests then to be determined? Their names could be changed if the father succeeded in establishing that it was in the best interests of the child for the mother not to
be the custodial parent. As a starting measure, however, surely it is a
reasonable policy to conclude that it is in the best interests of children
where the mother does not acknowledge the father for her to be entitled
to register their birth and select their names. Is the court in a better position to determine a child’s best interests than the mother or custodial
parent? Is the child’s best interests sufficiently ascertainable by judicial
method or even clear enough to support a legislative judicial decision?
This is a case where requiring the legislature to address the individual
interests irrespective of sex appears to be more symbolic than real and
without any compelling addition to the justice of the legislative regime.
49

Name Act, supra, note 40.
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A final irony is that the revised regime endorses hyphenated surnames
(ordered alphabetically), which equally preserves and distances children
by name from their parents.

V. NOVA SCOTIA (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD) V. MARTIN
In Martin50 the Court unanimously found that the exclusion of
chronic pain sufferers from a general compensation structure was an
unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of disability.
The two central questions arising from the case are whether it is
consistent with previous jurisprudence and whether it represents a human rights debate rather than a disagreement over a matter of legislative
tools and policy.
1. Reasoning
The legislative regime at issue arose from the difficulty of Workers’
Compensation systems addressing the circumstances of occult, chronic
pain. Rather than continuing to deal with chronic pain complaints on an
individual basis, a regulation was passed which, as noted by Cromwell
J.A. in the Court of Appeal, constituted:
…legislative judgment … that for Workers’ Compensation purposes, the
loss of earnings or permanent impairment flowing from chronic pain are
not reasonably attributed to the injury ….51

The Regulation defined chronic pain as follows:
The FRP Regulations and s. 10A of the Act define “chronic pain” as
“pain”:
(a) continuing beyond the normal recovery time for the type of
personal injury that precipitated, triggered or otherwise predated the
pain; or
(b) disproportionate to the type of personal injury that precipitated,
triggered or otherwise predated the pain,

50
51

Martin, supra, note 3.
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and includes chronic pain syndrome, fibromyalgia, myofascial pain
syndrome, and all other like or related conditions, but does not include
pain supported by significant, objective, physical findings at the site of the
injury which indicate that the injury has not healed.

The Court of Appeal had found that chronic pain sufferers were not
members of a group suffering historical disadvantage or stereotyping
and that the interests affected by the denial of benefits were merely
economic in nature and that the legislative regime was a response to the
reality of the complex circumstances of chronic pain in the context of
Workers’ Compensation benefits and did not demean the human dignity
of the claimants.
The legislative response identified by the Court of Appeal and arising from the terms of the regulation included the fact that expert advice
appeared to support the view that chronic pain treatment was best delivered by encouraging an early return to work and that the statutory definition of chronic pain included an element of mystery with respect to the
persistence of the pain itself. The regulation appears to have defined
chronic pain sufferers not merely as those suffering long-term pain, but
those suffering long-term pain where the original injury did not appear
to afford an explanation for the persistence of symptoms and there was
no objective medical evidence supporting the ongoing experience of
debilitating pain.52
In Martin,53 Gonthier J., writing for the Court, justified the conclusion in clear and reasonably brief reasons. The two most compelling
points in the Court’s reasoning appear to be: (1) the statute adopted a
regime in which persons were excluded from compensation benefits by
express reference to their disability; (2) unlike previous judgments of
the Court, the claimant was not challenging the WCB system, but rather
seeking to participate on equal terms with those suffering other forms of
disability.
To a greater degree than in Trociuk,54 the court reviewed the particular elements in the Law55 test. The Court determined that differential

52
Functional Restoration (Multi-Faceted Pain Services) Program Regulations, N.S.
Reg. 57/96, ss. 2(b)(i)(iii); 3(1)-(2); 4; 5(a)(b); 6; 7(1)-(2); 8(1)-(4).
53
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54
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treatment had been established on the basis of comparison with the
group of workers under the Act who did not have chronic pain and are
eligible for compensation.56 In reviewing the relevant ground of discrimination, the Court rejected the argument that since both members of
the claimant’s group and the comparative group suffer from physical
disabilities, there was no differential treatment on the basis of physical
disability. It held that it is sufficient that “…ascribing to an individual a
group characteristic is one factor in the treatment of that individual”.57
The Court identified the existence or absence of proof that the differential treatment is discriminatory in the substantive sense as critical
to the inquiry. In reviewing the four contextual factors identified in
Law58 to be used in determining whether discrimination has been established, the Court made it clear that not all factors will be relevant in
each case. Accordingly, the fact that chronic pain sufferers could establish no history of invidious stereotypes was unimportant if they could
establish a lack of correspondence between the differential treatment
imposed by the Act and the true needs and circumstances of the claimant’s group. In reviewing the second contextual factor of the degree of
correspondence with the needs and circumstances of the claimants, the
Court again identified the importance of determining the overall purpose
of the legislative scheme at issue and how it responds to the actual
needs, capacity or circumstances of those in the claimant group having
regard to their value as human beings and as members of Canadian
society, in short their essential human dignity as individuals.59
As already mentioned, at the core of the result was the Court’s conclusion that the provisions of the Act which exempted those suffering
from chronic pain as defined by the Regulations from the general provisions of the Act and restricting them to functional restoration program
and cut-off of benefits was a blanket exclusion on the basis of physical
disability. In effect, the Court found that the reality of the claimant
group is that:
[frequent pain] frequently evolves into a permanent and debilitating
condition. Yet, under the Act and the FRP Regulations, injured workers
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who develop such permanent impairment as a result of the chronic pain
may be left with nothing: no medical aid, no permanent impairment or
income replacement benefits, and no capacity to earn a living on their
own. This cannot be consistent with the purpose of the Act or with the
essential human dignity of these workers.60

Despite acknowledging that “classification and standardization are in
many cases necessary evils”,61 the Court concluded that:
On the contrary, the treatment of injured workers suffering from chronic
pain under the Act is not based on an evaluation of their individual
situations, but rather on the indefensible assumption that their needs are
identical. In effect, the Act stamps them all with the “chronic pain” label,
deprives them of a personalized evaluation of their needs and
circumstances, and restricts the benefits they can receive to a uniform and
strictly limited program.62

Dealing with the other two contextual factors, the Court concluded that
the ameliorative purpose of the Workers’ Compensation systems generally cannot shield “an outright failure to recognize the actual needs of an
entire category of injured workers…”.63 Finally, it held that the interests
in receiving Workers’ Compensation benefits went beyond the economic level, and that the exclusion from benefits reinforces the stereotype that chronic pain is not “real” and does not warrant individual
assessment or adequate compensation.
2. Section 1 Analysis
The Court was able to dismiss the section 1 justification offered by
the province briefly on the basis that the central point that the regulations appear to be aimed at ensuring that the resources of the compensation scheme are directed to workers who are genuinely unable to work.
While acknowledging that the Act and regulations were rationally connected to that objective, the fact that the blanket exclusion applied to all
claims connected to chronic pain, in the words of the Court, “… makes
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it patently obvious that the challenged provisions do not minimally
impair the equality rights of chronic pain sufferers”.64
In essence, it held that a blanket exclusion did not evidence a principled response to chronic pain.
As in Trociuk65 the Court identified the “message” being sent by the
legislative structure. In Martin66 the message was that chronic pain
sufferers as a whole were malingerers and not suffering genuine injury
like other WCB claimants.
The reasoning of the Court gives rise to at least three significant
concerns:
1. The regulation did not appear to (notwithstanding the labelling)
exclude all persons suffering from chronic pain, but rather only
those suffering from chronic pain where their initial injury did
not appear to explain its persistence and where no objective evidence supported its ongoing reality.
While there can be no doubt that a suspicion of malingering
surrounds these cases, are they as a distinct body of persons suffering a similar disability, or do they represent instead a population of Workers’ Compensation claimants whose benefits were
restricted by reason of the character of the evidence in support of
their claim? Would it be unconstitutional to confine compensation to objectively verifiable injuries?
2. The Court appears to have accepted that the consensus of expert
evidence is that persons suffering chronic pain without objective
underlying conditions are best treated by being encouraged to return to work and hence being removed from the compensation
system, or at least its benefits. This raises the difficult tension between the traditional suspicion of malingering and the more generous, but nevertheless similar concern, that the existence of
ongoing disability payments may in fact interfere with a person
returning to a full life, as well as result in an unjustified drain on
the compensation fund.
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3. Is this a debate in which a human rights dimension is truly
raised? The arbitrary character of Workers’ Compensation systems arose very early in the section 15 jurisprudence when widows complained about their exclusion from the tort recovery
system without regard to their particular circumstances. Those
complaints were dismissed without counsel for the respondents or
government intervenors being called upon in the Nova Scotia
Workers’ Compensation reference in 1989: Reference re Workers’ Compensation Act 1983 (Nfld.).67 However, this previous
analysis was based explicitly on an analogous grounds analysis
which stated that survivors of workers killed in the workplace
were not a disadvantaged group suffering historical disadvantage
or stereotype.
More recently, the necessity for blunt (if not arbitrary) legislative distinctions in any compensation system was addressed by the
Court in Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)68 where the Court unanimously dismissed a complaint
based upon the differing qualification periods for disability as between those suffering permanent disability and those suffering periods of temporary disability. In that case, persons suffering
permanent disability were entitled to claim the benefit of dropout
provisions which relieved them of having to pay into the compensation system for the same period as others. Nevertheless, persons
suffering serial temporary disabilities were not entitled to claim the
benefit of the same dropout provisions. The Court unanimously
found that there was no human rights dimension to this type of distinction and that government needed to be allowed to manage a
compensation scheme (particularly one having insurance-like
components) embodying periods of qualification and the like that
might embody differences between similarly situated groups.
Certainly it could be argued by persons suffering a number of
periods of temporary disability that they are being treated as malingerers by not receiving similar dropout credits to those suffering more chronic disabilities.
67
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COMMENTARY: The heart of the Court’s reasoning in Martin69 revolves around the obvious refusal of the legislature to take
an individualized approach to the problem of chronic pain. In essence, the Court has held that in relation to selecting who may or
may not participate in a comprehensive compensation scheme, as
well as the various conditions of qualification and determination
of benefits, the Court recognizes that legislatures must standardize and classify. However, within the scheme itself the Court has
recognized a substantial role for section 15 to require a consistency of approach across all forms of disability. In essence, the
Court has found that however uncomfortable and administratively difficult, genuinely disabled persons suffering from conditions which are difficult to diagnose and treat must be dealt with
individually rather than by reference to their condition.
From an analytical point of view, the four contextual factors in
Law70 clearly shaped and framed the analysis in Martin71 in a
way that was both appropriate and measured. The references to
human dignity are conclusory rather than analytical but none the
worse for being so. While the Court could certainly be convicted
of having a robust view of the scope of judicial expertise, the
matters touched on and debated in Martin72 are organically connected to the concerns of the individuals afflicted with physical
or mental disability and affected by the actions of government.
Both the regimes in Granovsky73 and Martin74 appear to be blunt and
over-broad in their impact on persons suffering a variety of disabilities.
Indeed, are the two populations in Granovsky75 and Martin76 any different in character? In Martin,77 only some chronic pain sufferers were
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excluded, albeit all those without objectively verifiable symptoms. In
Granovsky,78 only those with temporary disabilities as a result of back
pain were excluded, but all such persons? Although the exclusion in
Martin79 was by reference to a disability, it was not solely on the basis
of disability, but rather other relevant concerns coupled with the
presentation of that type of disability.
One obvious effect of Martin80 is a clear statement by the Court that
in certain circumstances the identification of the claimant as a member
of a historically disadvantaged group will be of little or no impact in an
equality analysis. The same could also be said of Trociuk.81
As recognized by the Court, the messages contained within these
legislative distinctions were each anchored in means which were relevant to the purposes of the legislation. The fact that a mother does not
acknowledge the father of her children at their birth appears to the writer
to constitute a relevant fact in how one requires her to register the births
over the next 30 days and who one allows to select their initial surname?
The legislative preference of biological mothers and custodial parents in
the naming of young children may be wrong, but does not seem discriminatory.
In relation to the regime in Martin the analysis seems strained when
it strives to view the legislative distinction as based upon a stereotype
relating to chronic pain sufferers. The Court’s conclusion seems just as
strong when it criticizes the absence of a correlation between the legislative goal and those people affected by its chosen means of distinction. In
this sense a stereotype is condemned because of just such a discrepancy,
but newly realized means of discrimination may be just as deserving of
censure without having any historical stereotype associated with them.
What is surely required is a persuasive criticism of the means chosen by
the legislature: in Martin that effort seems much more developed and
sound than in Trociuk.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Equality remains an elusive concept. There is a necessary variation
in the impact on the analysis of the ground of distinction and the character of legislative treatment of that distinction. We cannot reasonably
hope for a formulaic answer which will satisfy all concerned. While
Law82 can be criticized for excluding little, it has the advantage of including all that may be valuable in a discrimination analysis.
The heart of the matter nevertheless remains obscure. When is an
over-inclusive distinction involving an enumerated ground discriminatory? When is a poor or out-of-date law as a result unconstitutional? It is
unclear whether the essential human dignity sought to be preserved by
the Court is being accurately measured in these judgments.
The identification of the statutory policy in Martin83 seems preferable to that in Trociuk.84 Furthermore, it is easy to comprehend a fair
and more individualized system of compensation for chronic pain than
that under review in Martin.85 On the other hand, the legislative choice
relating to the selecting and changing of surnames in the British Columbia legislation appears to have been supplanted by a judicial adjudication of the child’s best interests. It is certainly not clear to this writer
that the judicial system is preferable to that selected by the legislature.
The court is not deaf to the risk that the application of section 15
might be corrosive of its public acceptance. In dismissing the section 15
claims in R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine based upon discrimination
against the class of recreational marijuana users, Iacobucci J. stated:
…To uphold Malmo-Levine’s argument for recreational choice (or
lifestyle protection) on the basis of s. 15 of the Charter would simply be to
create a parody of a noble purpose.86

What does seem to be occurring, however, is that the Court is
gradually developing a jurisprudence where in a common-law-like fashion legislators are learning what kinds of distinctions will survive constitutional scrutiny and which will not. Blunt legislative exclusions
82
83
84
85
86

Law, supra, note 55.
Martin, supra, note 76.
Trociuk, supra, note 65.
Martin, supra, note 76.
[2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 185, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79.

100

Supreme Court Law Review

(2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d)

which can be characterized as arbitrary when founded upon enumerated
or analogous grounds represent legislative choices that must be approached carefully by legislators.
The Court is obviously committed to taking section 15(1)’s express
reference to physical and mental disability seriously. This being said the
challenges of applying the Law87 analysis to a broadly defined sense of
disability in relation to the crafting of government programs is likely to
create great and difficult problems. Part of the problem is identifying
people with any recognizably different medical condition as suffering a
physical disability: so the two populations of back injury sufferers in
Granovsky88 are entitled to have their treatment under the benefits regime compared under a section 15(1) analysis. Similarly, the population
of chronic pain sufferers is treated as a distinct population in Martin.89
The other part of the challenge is that determining whether discrimination has been proven is made more complex when the principal demand
on government is for accommodation, as was the case in Eldridge v.
British Columbia (Attorney General).90
These cases can be reconciled. Eldridge91 required the provision of
deaf translators for access to hospital services and is a case of accommodating access to the general medical system. Martin92 is a case of
arbitrary and blanket exclusion by express reference to a particular disability. Granovsky93 is simply a case of differing benefits being crafted
to deal with different conditions.
This may be too easy. No evidence for a clear need for publicly
funded translators for deaf people using medical services is referred to
in Eldridge.94 The unfairness of someone suffering repeated disabilities
from back injury losing their qualification for public benefits when
someone having a more chronic condition benefits from a relief from
qualification is a type that is a common feature of benefit programs, but
that makes it no less real. Beneath the surface of the arbitrary exclusion
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in Martin95 appear to be very real differences in the conditions being
considered by the legislation.
In the 2004 term, the Court heard arguments in the Auton (Guardian
ad Litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General)96 case from British
Columbia. In that case, the Courts below found that the province’s refusal to extend public funding for intensive behavioural therapy for
autistic children constituted a violation of section 15(1). The case involves a challenge to the design of the publicly funded medical system,
which does not include behavioural therapy in its funded services. It
also concerns a controversial and expensive therapy that is considered
critical by those caring for children suffering from autism. This case will
no doubt give the Court the opportunity to clarify and advance our understanding of section 15(1) in perhaps its most challenging context to
date.
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